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Abstract 
 
The present experiment used the choice blindness methodology to examine introspection, self-
knowledge, and the instability of preferences within the domain of consumer choice. The sample 
consisted of 60 participants between the ages of 18 and 23. Participants completed a consumer 
goods questionnaire that contained the choice blindness manipulation of either the price or the 
other attributes of the laptop item and a demographic questionnaire. A strong choice blindness 
effect was established and over 70% of participants failed to detect the manipulation of the 
laptop item. Participants were also significantly more likely to detect the manipulation of the 
laptop’s  price  than  the  other  choice  attributes.  While  participants  who  originally chose the 
cheaper laptop were more likely to detect the manipulation, this difference was not significant. 
Interestingly, out of the participants who did not detect the manipulation, many people gave 
verbal justification and reasoning for the choice they did not originally pick. Most of these 
justifications were self-contradictory, in which participants rated either the price or the other 
specific attribute(s) that they justified to be very important in their initial decision prior to the 
switch. The results demonstrated that preferences are not only constructed to make a particular 
choice, but are also shaped by the outcome of a decision. Practical implications for choice 
blindness in consumer decision-making and directions for future research are discussed.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHOICE BLINDNESS 
 
3 
Acknowledgments 
 First, I would like to thank my thesis advisor, Professor Vyse for his patient guidance, 
enthusiastic encouragement, and helpful critiques during this entire process. I could not have 
asked for a more welcoming and inspiring mentor. I consider myself very fortunate to have been 
his student throughout my time at Connecticut College.  
 Second, I would like to extend thanks to my thesis readers, Professor Devlin and 
Professor Nier. Both professors provided me with instrumental feedback and revisions for the 
final product. Their guidance in regard to APA formatting was especially valuable.  
 Finally, I would like to thank Petter Johansson for sparking my interest in choice 
blindness. I am so grateful for the opportunity to have conducted such innovative research (and a 
bit of magic) while studying abroad.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHOICE BLINDNESS 
 
4 
Table of Contents 
Abstract............................................................................................................................................2 
Acknowledgments............................................................................................................................3 
Table of Contents.............................................................................................................................4 
List of Tables...................................................................................................................................5 
List of Figures..................................................................................................................................6 
List of Appendices...........................................................................................................................7 
Introduction......................................................................................................................................8 
Method...........................................................................................................................................25 
Results............................................................................................................................................31 
Discussion......................................................................................................................................41 
References......................................................................................................................................48 
Appendices.....................................................................................................................................56 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHOICE BLINDNESS 
 
5 
List of Tables 
Table 1: Distribution of Detections, Non-Detections, Non-Detecting Participants Who Offered  
 
Justification, and Non-Detecting Participants Who Gave Self-Contradictory  
 
Justification....................................................................................................................................32 
 
Table 2: Means and Standard Deviations for the Rating of Price and the Mean Rating of the  
 
Other Attributes for Detection, Non-Detection, and Both Manipulation  
 
Conditions......................................................................................................................................35 
 
Table 3: Means and Standard Deviations for the Rating of Price and the Mean Rating of the  
 
Other Attributes for Justification, No Justification, and Both Manipulation  
 
Conditions......................................................................................................................................38 
 
Table 4: Means and Standard Deviations for the Rating of Price and the Mean Rating of the  
 
Other Attributes for Self-Contradictory Justification, No Self-Contradictory Justification, and  
 
Both Manipulation Conditions.......................................................................................................40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHOICE BLINDNESS 
 
6 
List of Figures 
Figure 1: Placing the Duplicate Section Over the Original Choice Attributes.............................26 
 
Figure 2: Overall Detection Rates.................................................................................................31 
 
Figure 3: Detection Comparison....................................................................................................33 
Figure 4: Price Detection Comparison..........................................................................................36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHOICE BLINDNESS 
 
7 
List of Appendices 
Appendix A: Informed Consent.....................................................................................................56 
Appendix B: Consumer Goods Questionnaire..............................................................................57 
Appendix C: Demographic Questionnaire....................................................................................60 
Appendix D: Debriefing Form.......................................................................................................62 
Appendix E: Non-Detecting Participant Justification and Self-Contradictory Justification  
 
Quotes............................................................................................................................................63 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHOICE BLINDNESS 
 
8 
Choice Blindness in Consumer Decision-Making 
People make countless choices in their day-to-day life: some are slow and deliberate; 
some are rapid and intuitive; some carry only minor significance; and others greatly impact our 
lives. For all the intimate familiarity we have with everyday choice and decision-making, it is 
difficult to examine the underlying representations of this process. Similarly, it is challenging to 
determine  what  we  know  about  our  choices  from  the  “inside,”  by  reflection  and  introspection  
(Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Decades of work on human decision-making stressing either rational 
or irrational aspects of choice behavior have yet to find an effective method for using 
introspection to study consumer choice (Krueger & Funder, 2004; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).      
Consumer choice and decision-making have been topics of extensive research in the 
fields of both psychology and economics. Traditionally, explanations of consumer behavior are 
rooted in cognitive psychology. Before people choose to buy a product, they engage in elaborate, 
conscious information processing (Chaiken, 1980; Petty, Cacioppo, & Schumann, 1983). 
Information processing may lead to certain attitudes, and these attitudes affect preferences and 
subsequent decision-making. Attitudes relate to any entity that people can either like or dislike. 
Entities may include physical objects, living beings, and/or abstract concepts. Attitudes can be 
based on cognitive beliefs/schemas or more on affect, such as when a product triggers an 
emotional response (Venkatraman & MacInness, 1985).  
From a purely economic perspective, consumer choice and purchase are the result of a 
rational exchange: two agents meet in the market and trade goods to maximize their individual 
utilities. The Standard Economic Model of consumer behavior implies that the decision to buy 
(or not to buy) is determined by the anticipated net utility of purchasing a product or service 
(Deaton & Muellbaur, 1980). According to the Standard Economic Model and popular 
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neoclassical  economics,  attitudes  determine  preferences  and  that  an  individual’s  choice  between  
products is simply his or her revealed preference. In this model, attitudes and preferences are 
unchanged or affected by immaterial or irrelevant factors. Attitudes and preferences also should 
not be incompatible with empirical observations known to the individual, including his or her 
own rational, conscious actions. Finally, it is assumed that there is coherence among attitudes 
and preferences (Wilkinson, 2008).  
The idea that stable  and  identifiable  preferences  guide  consumers’  rational  choices  
between alternative outcomes is well established within the field of economics (Wilkinson, 
2008). However, economic theory is an idealization of how people make decisions, and research 
has suggested that it is not an accurate reflection of reality. For example, numerous studies have 
demonstrated that people fear losing money more than they desire to win (Goldberg & von 
Nitzsch, 2001; Tversky & Kahneman, 1979, 1991). This tendency to strongly avoid losses is 
termed loss aversion and is grounded in both economic and decision theory. Furthermore, 
Dijksterhuis, Smith, Van Baaren, and Wigboldus (2005) argue against the traditional economic 
view that the typical consumer is highly analytical, rational, and not greatly influenced by 
emotions when making decisions. Instead, they suggest that consumers are primarily driven to 
make  choices  based  on  “gut  feelings,”  or  unconscious  processes.  They  contend  that  this  lack  of  
insight represents an absence of deliberative information processing. In other words, people 
sometimes cannot offer a reason why they chose one product over another because there was no 
thoughtful, rational, or conscious reason in the first place.  
There is abundant evidence for the existence of two kinds of processing in human 
reasoning and decision-making. One type is automatic and fast, requiring little or no effort and 
no sense of voluntary control. The other is slow, deliberate, and conscious. These two systems of 
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the mind are now widely referred to as System 1 and System 2 respectively (Kahneman & 
Fredrick, 2002; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich, 1999). According to Kahneman (2011), System 1 
continuously generates suggestions for System 2: impressions, intuitions, and feelings. If 
endorsed by System 2, these impressions and intuitions become beliefs, and impulses turn into 
voluntary actions. Dijksterhuis et al. propose that consumer behavior is often driven more by 
System 1 and salient environmental cues than by stable internal preferences. These 
environmental cues are thought to influence consumer decision-making outside of System 2 and 
conscious awareness (Chartrand, 2005).    
North, Margreaves, and McKendrick (1997) found evidence to support the 
aforementioned view. When French music was played throughout a store, customers purchased 
French wines more readily, and when German music was played, German wines were bought 
more frequently. In this study,  consumers  were  unaware  of  the  music’s  influence  in  their  
decision-making process. An important question to ask is whether the insights provided by 
consumers about their preferences and decision-making are actually reliable. Consumers appear 
to find it relatively easy to explain why they made a certain judgment or choice. However, it is 
considerably more difficult to test whether the explanation provided is valid.    
There has been little psychological research that explicitly explores unstable preferences 
and  people’s  subsequent  reflections  about  these  inclinations.  Bem’s self-perception theory (1967, 
1972) argues that people tend to infer their intentions from their actions, after the fact. 
Consequently, it is as if people are unconscious of their original intentions and can only infer 
them  based  on  their  actions.  One  implication  of  this  theory  is  that  people’s  preferences  can  be  
easily distorted, leading them to make irrational decisions.  
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Change Blindness  
The present study and the choice blindness methodology are related to change blindness, 
which is described as a phenomenon where people often fail to notice dramatic changes in a 
visual scene following a brief interruption (Grimes, 1996; Henderson, 1997; Pashler, 1988; 
Rensink,  O’Regan,  &  Clark,  1997).  Over  the  past  two  decades,  change  blindness  has  greatly  
contributed to our understanding of attention, perception, and consciousness. Grimes (1996) 
discovered that viewers did not notice significant changes to photographs that were made while 
their glance was diverted. For example, over 50% of observers failed to notice when two 
cowboys sitting on a bench exchanged heads. These shocking results inspired others to examine 
whether similar failures could occur without  eye  movements.  The  “flicker  task”  is  one  of  these  
paradigms (Rensink et al., 1997, p. 368). The task incorporates an original and modified scene 
that is alternated repeatedly, separated by a brief blank display, until participants notice the 
change. In the flicker task experiment, observers eventually noticed most changes but took an 
astonishingly long time to do so. Both of these techniques involve a common element: they 
impair localization of the motion signals that accompanied the change. This component suggests 
that attention is needed for change perception. In addition, change blindness seems to result 
whenever the accompanying motion signals fail to draw attention (Simons & Rensink, 2004).  
Other studies found that these effects are even stronger when the changes are unexpected. 
For instance, when an actor in a scene was changed during a shift in camera position, most 
observers did not notice, even when a different person replaced the actor (Levin & Simons, 
1997). In another study conducted by Simons and Levin (1998), a man holding a map 
approached random pedestrians and asked them for directions. About a minute later, two men 
with a door walked between the man and the pedestrian. The man with the map quickly switched 
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places with one of the men carrying  the  door.  As  the  door  was  removed  from  the  pedestrian’s  
view, a new man was standing holding a map. The pedestrians most often failed to notice this 
change and acted as if the same man were asking them for directions. The use of naturalistic 
stimuli represents a departure from earlier change blindness research. This difference helped 
bridge the gap between simple laboratory stimuli and complex stimuli typically found in the real 
world.  
The fact that change blindness occurs under naturalistic conditions strongly supports the 
view that this phenomenon is a general failure to retain and/or compare information from 
moment to moment (Simons & Rensink, 2004). Another noteworthy finding established by 
recent change blindness research is that attention is necessary to recognize a change. 
Modifications to semantically central items are detected faster than changes elsewhere, even 
when the changes are of equal physical salience (Kelley, Chun, & Chua, 2003). This suggests 
that objects that selectively receive attention are more likely to be encoded and compared. 
Selective attention and faster change detection imply earlier attention to the changed item. For 
example, social drug users are more likely to detect alterations to drug paraphernalia in images 
than are non-drug users and American football experts are better at spotting meaningful changes 
to football scenes than are novices (Jones, Jones, Smith, & Copley, 2003; Werner & Thies, 
2000). The full potential of change blindness as a tool for studying the human mind is far from 
realized because it has only been used to examine perceptual aspects of cognition.    
According to Johansson and Lars (2008), aside from change blindness, there has been 
surprisingly little research investigating our ability to detect changes in items that are of 
particular importance to us – i.e., when changes in the visual environment have effects in relation 
to our intentions and actions. As Rensink (2002) has stated: 
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The study of change detection has evolved over many years, proceeding through phases 
that have emphasized different types of stimuli and different types of tasks. All studies, 
however, rely on the same basic design. An observer is initially shown a particular 
stimulus…and  the  response  of  the  observer  is  then  measured.  (p.  251)   
Other  striking  examples  of  our  unawareness  come  from  research  on  people’s  inability  to  
reflect upon the reasoning behind their own judgments and behaviors. As reported by Nisbett and 
Wilson (1977), people lack introspective access to higher cognitive processes that drive our 
choices, evaluations, and behaviors. Therefore, our own introspective reports are often false. In 
one experiment, the participants were instructed to choose between pairs of panty hose. Though 
the pairs were identical, the participants displayed a strong right hand bias, choosing the pair on 
the right more often than any other pair. When asked why they picked a specific pair, the 
participants reported that they based their choice on the superior quality of the chosen pair. 
Nisbett and Wilson (1977) claim that we do not justify our responses based on memories of the 
cognitive processes involved in decision-making. Instead they suggest that we justify responses 
based on the theoretical knowledge of how influential certain factors would have been in driving 
our behavior.  
Common sense implies that we know when actions are our own because we have caused 
them; we are informed of what we do by our conscious will. This phenomenon leads us to 
believe that our activities are caused by consciousness. Recent cognitive, social, and 
neuropsychological studies have argued that the subjective experiences of our conscious will are 
fundamentally misguided. Furthermore, our conscious will has been thought to be an illusion 
created by the brain (Gazzaniga, 1998; Roth, 2003; Wegner, 2002, 2003).  This  “illusion  claim”  
is based on the finding that neuronal activity leading to a consciously willed action occurs before 
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the conscious decision to engage in that action (Libet, 1985). People are typically not aware of 
this discrepancy because the mind retrospectively fabricates a coherent story that is accessible to 
subjective experience (van Duijn & Bem, 2005). Thus, introspection is asserted to provide us 
only with access to an illusory causal path from thought to action (Wegner, 2003). Relatedly, 
Brasil-Neto et al. (1992) used focal magnetic stimulation of the motor cortex to elicit a finger 
movement. Despite this, participants still reported that they had decided themselves to move that 
finger. As demonstrated by this evidence, there is doubt over how much rational, introspective 
access people actually have to their thoughts, processes, and actions that affect decision-making.    
Choice Blindness 
Without  somehow  being  able  to  challenge  people’s  responses,  it  is  very  difficult  to  
objectively demonstrate that people lack introspective access into their own cognitive processes. 
In a series of studies, Johansson and his colleagues modified the basic design of change 
blindness experiments to incorporate introspection and additional non-perceptual elements of 
cognition.  The  result  is  a  research  tool  called  “choice  blindness,”  a  newly  discovered  
phenomenon within the field of experimental psychology that expands on previous change 
blindness research to assess the relationship between introspection and self-knowledge 
(Johansson, Hall, Sikström, & Olsson, 2005). Specifically, choice blindness examines to what 
extent people are able to detect when the outcome of a choice is inconsistent with their previous 
intention and goals; this is a capacity taken for granted in many established theories of decision-
making (Ridderinkhof, van den Wildenberg, Segalowitz, & Carter, 2004).  
Choice blindness is inspired by close-up card trick techniques that permit the 
experimenter to secretly manipulate the relationship between choice and outcome. When 
participants give a verbal explanation for choices they did not make in choice blindness 
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experiments, it is possible to highlight the malleability of preferences. It has been suggested that 
choice  blindness  is  concerned  with  the  brain’s  representation  at  the  moment  of  the  selection  as  
well as any process that compares this depiction with the other after the choice has been made 
(Johansson, Hall, Sikström, Tärning, & Lind, 2006). The choice blindness paradigm differs from 
change blindness because it involves a mismatch between the intended choice and the choice 
with which individuals were actually presented.   
In a study performed by Johansson et al. (2005), two pictures of female faces were 
presented and the experimenters asked participants to choose the face they found more attractive. 
The chosen image was then handed to the researcher and participants were asked why they chose 
that picture. However, on some trials the picture was covertly switched and the participants were 
given the one that they did not choose. Less than 30% of these swaps were detected across all 
conditions. Most people not only failed to notice the switch, but they often gave several 
explanations for the choice that they did not actually make. The effect of the manipulation on 
participants’  attitudes  toward  the  manipulated  stimulus  was  also  examined.  This  aspect  of  the  
study demonstrated that exposure to, and reasoning about, mismatched outcomes can generate 
substantial preference change. In the subsequent choice, participants came to prefer the 
manipulated faces. Therefore, the choice blindness phenomenon demonstrates that preferences 
can be easily distorted, leading people to make irrational decisions.  
In order to investigate whether the choice blindness phenomenon existed outside a 
laboratory and in a more naturalistic setting, Hall, Johansson, Tärning, Sikström, and Deutgen 
(2010) set up a table at a local supermarket and invited passers by to participate in a blind taste 
test comparing either the taste of two jams or the fragrance of two teas. Johansson and his 
colleagues created two sets of jars with two compartments/lids at both ends, which enabled them 
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to secretly switch the contents of the jars. Once again a choice blindness effect was found. All 
the tastes (as evaluated by independent raters) were significantly different. The most striking 
finding was that individuals still failed to detect the switch between dramatic taste differences, 
such as a swap between grapefruit and cinnamon-apple. Furthermore, participants readily 
provided coherent and convincing explanations for the choices they actually did not make. Thus, 
choice blindness methodology is relevant within the domain of consumer choice. It is also 
important to note that choice blindness is not restricted to evaluations of faces or to the 
representations of visual patterns in general. 
Choice blindness has additionally been found for preferences and decisions that are 
perceived to be fundamentally stable. Hall, Johansson, and Strandberg (2012) asked participants 
to express their attitudes and opinions about moral dilemmas that were receiving attention in the 
media. Participants were asked to express whether they agreed or disagreed with various moral 
statements in a survey. Using the choice blindness methodology, some of the statements that 
participants agreed or disagreed with were reversed. They found that over 50% of participants 
endorsed a statement that they did not originally make with the same fervor as was true of the 
non-manipulated statements. These results demonstrate that even our moral attitudes are 
malleable and relatively unstable. A recent choice blindness study has reported similar findings 
for self-ratings of personality traits, which are assumed to be stable as well (Johansson, Tentori, 
Harris, Hall, & Chater, in preparation).  
Not only do participants in choice blindness research appear to demonstrate preference 
change by endorsing a decision they did not make, it has also been demonstrated to affect future 
decision-making. Hall, Johansson, Tärning, Sikström, and Chater (in preparation) repeated 
Johansson et al.’s (2005) original choice blindness task and added a second round of choosing 
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between the same pairs of faces following a delay. The authors found that participants who 
received no manipulation in the first round displayed a 93% consistency between their first and 
second round choices. Participants who received the manipulation in the first round displayed a 
53% consistency between first and second round choices. This preference change was also 
apparent outside of pair-wise comparisons. The rejected faces (that participants were led to 
believe were their preferred choices) were actually rated higher when compared to the originally 
chosen faces. This discrepancy suggests that the choice blindness effect caused enduring changes 
in preference.  
These studies have demonstrated that choice blindness is a robust, replicable, and 
dramatic effect. The choice blindness methodology is ideal for examining consumer behavior, as 
it explores the malleability of preference formation and covers numerous aspects of decision-
making, including unconscious processes. 
The Unconscious Consumer and Preference Formation 
Consumer behavior and factors that drive consumer choice are growing topics of interest 
within the field of social psychology. It has been argued that non-conscious processes often drive 
consumer behavior (Dijksterhuis et al., 2005). It is crucial to explore the unique ways in which 
consumers’  decisions  are  influenced  outside  of  conscious  awareness  in  order  to  target  products  
and services more effectively. Dijksterhuis et al. (2005) describe conscious awareness in regard 
to consumer decision-making by suggesting a simple dichotomy: consumers are either aware of 
why they made the choices they made or not. It has also been suggested that there are different 
types of awareness, varying with respect to the particular stage of the decision-making process of 
which the consumer is either aware or unaware (Chartrand, 2005). Researchers need to clearly 
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define the different types of awareness, most notably for the implications of what consumers can 
control when making a decision.  
Research has been conducted that explicitly focuses on non-conscious influences on 
consumer choice. Chartrand (2005) used unconscious behavior as a general framework of 
analysis and argued that mental processes that occur outside conscious awareness often influence 
consumer behavior. The experimenter identified three types of awareness: the environmental 
features that trigger an automatic process, the automatic process itself, and the outcome of that 
automatic process. If individuals are unaware of one or more of these stages, they are making a 
non-conscious decision. Chartrand also  used  the  phrase,  “introspectively  blank”  when  describing  
non-conscious processes prior to choice. This phrasing better captures the lack of awareness on 
the part of the consumer: a choice is made, but when asked why they made a choice, consumers 
are often at a loss for an explanation. The choice blindness methodology can be used to build a 
more comprehensive understanding of non-conscious processes, specifically using introspection 
to study the outcome of the automatic processes that influence consumer decision-making and 
behavior. Choice blindness is a particularly interesting method for this purpose, as it touches 
upon implicit and explicit processes and also taps into multiple aspects of decision-making 
(Johansson et al., 2005).    
Many psychologists argue that preference is not a well-formulated and enduring state. 
Instead, they contend that we construct our preferences in the moment and as needed (Kahneman 
& Snell, 1992; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993; Shafir, Simonson, & Tversky, 1993; Slovic, 
1995). Ariely and Norton (2008) suggest that most decisions are made in the moment on the 
basis of situational factors. They claim that most people tend to underestimate these situational 
influences and attribute their decisions to stable, internal preference. Situational factors can be 
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arbitrary and unrelated to the decision-making process. For instance, Ariely, Loewenstein, and 
Prelec  (2003)  found  that  recalling  one’s  social  security  number  prior  to  a  decision-making 
process acted as an anchor for how much a person was willing to bid in an auction for a bottle of 
wine. After recalling these digits, individuals with a higher social security number were willing 
to pay significantly more for a bottle of wine than those with lower social security numbers.   
Additionally, Ariely and Norton (2008) suggest that past memories of decision-making 
can also affect current preference formation and situational factors. According to the authors, we 
are likely to make decisions consistent with what and how we remember we acted in past 
situations. In this way decisions can influence preference formation, as well as reflecting our 
preferences.  Ariely  and  Norton’s  theory  is  supported  by  Hall et al.’s  (in  preparation)  choice  
blindness study, in which participants made decisions consistent with what they were led to 
believe  they  chose  beforehand  in  a  similar  situation.  This  “copying”  behavior  is  thought  to  be  
more than merely a heuristic (i.e., a cognitive shortcut) to make decisions quickly with minimal 
cognitive involvement (Chater, Johansson, & Hall, 2011).   
When discussing theories of decision-making, a common belief is that people are able to 
identify mismatches between intentions and outcomes, adjust their behavior when dealing with 
an error, and adapt  to  changing  situations.  Thus,  intentions  and  their  outcomes  form  a  “tight  
loop”  (Ridderinkhof, van den Wildenberg, Segalowitz, & Carter, 2004). Festinger (1957) 
claimed that we actively attempt to make choices that are consistent with our previous decisions 
to decrease the effects of cognitive dissonance. This classic phenomenon can be defined as a 
psychologically uncomfortable state that results from choosing to act in a way that is inconsistent 
with our previous attitudes and behaviors. After a decision is made, a new cognitive element 
representing the decision may appear. One could assume that an individual is no longer in 
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conflict after making a choice because he or she has committed to one alternative. However, 
Festinger (1957) explained that the decision maker might also experience dissonance at this point 
because the cognitive element representing the choice is dissonant with the cognitive elements 
characterizing the negative aspects of the chosen alternative and the cognitive elements that 
embody the  positive  aspects  of  the  alternative  that  is  declined.  In  accordance  with  Festinger’s  
theory, Brehm (1956) found that after a choice between items is made, we come to prefer the 
chosen item more and prefer the rejected item even less. In order to develop an adaptive 
decision-making behavior, an individual must be able to control and compare the outcomes of 
his or her choices with the intentions and goals that have previously been established 
(Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; Ullsperger & von Cramon, 2004).  
Although there is evidence suggesting that after making a decision people will justify 
their decisions by making the chosen alternative more attractive and the rejected alternative less 
attractive (Festinger, 1964), there is relatively little support of this phenomenon in a more 
naturalistic setting. Frenkel and Doob (1976) conducted two experiments in the context of two 
general elections, using voters as subjects. Participants were interviewed either immediately 
before they committed themselves to a decision by voting or immediately after they had voted. In 
both elections, voters were more likely to believe that their candidate was the best and had a 
higher chance of winning after they had voted as opposed to before they voted. Similarly, 
Lawler, Kuleck, Rhode, and Sorensen (1975) examined the job choice and post-decision 
attitudes and behavior of accounting students. Results collected after the job choice decision was 
made showed that the selected firms increased in attractiveness after choice and the rejected 
firms decreased in desirability. Following one year of employment, participants rated all firms 
lower in attractiveness than they had before they applied for jobs. Frenkel and Doob (1976) and 
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Lawler et al. (1975) have established that post-decision cognitive dissonance in a real-world 
setting is a reliable effect. Conventional laboratory studies of decision-making typically have 
subjects decide between two novel objects about which they do not have well-anchored attitudes.  
It is now widely accepted that consumers often construct their preferences and make 
choices at the moment when they need to decide. This pattern makes them susceptible to a wide 
range  of  influences  (Simonson,  2005).  Thus,  contrary  to  the  classical  economic  view  of  people’s  
utility functions, it is no longer assumed that preferences are stable and well defined. The issue is 
that people are oblivious to what extent these situational factors affect their behavior. 
Mismatches between intention and outcome are certainly conceivable in real-world 
decision-making. Perhaps you are out to dinner with a friend and he or she decides to order the 
tiramisu for dessert. However, there was a mix-up in the kitchen and he or she receives the bread 
pudding instead. One of three scenarios may possibly follow: your friend does not react, eats the 
dish as if he or she had ordered it, and goes on about how he or she made such a great decision to 
order the bread pudding. Your friend may recognize the error and decide to eat the bread 
pudding without making a fuss. Or, your friend may confront the waiter immediately saying 
there had been a mistake. The choice blindness methodology was designed specifically to 
examine the result of manipulating the relationship between choice and outcome as well as the 
instability of preference formation.  
The Present Study 
One of the most applicable aspects of choice blindness research to real world decision-
making involves individual preference formation and change. As observed in previous 
experiments, once participants have confirmed and argued for the opposite of their choice, they 
have established a modification of their original preference. Therefore, choice blindness 
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demonstrates how fluid and malleable consumer preferences can be. Consumer choice is an ideal 
domain to test the choice blindness paradigm. This experiment used choice blindness 
methodology to examine introspection and self-knowledge in the domain of consumer choice. 
Most decision-making theories are based on the fact that people are able to notice when their 
intentions and the consequences of their choices do not correlate. Even so, it is difficult to 
identify the internal processes involved in these decisions by means of reflection and 
introspection.   
The idea that people have stable and identifiable preferences that guide their choices 
between alternative outcomes is one of the fundamental aspects of economic theory. 
Neoclassical economic theory, rational choice theory, and expected utility theory all share this 
assumption (Wilkinson, 2008). Within these theories, methodologies have been established for 
identifying stable and rational preferences of consumers. The present study connected the choice 
blindness methodology to various facets of economic theory.  
The choice blindness paradigm was used to investigate the stability of consumer views 
and preferences. The experiment itself examined the outcome of manipulating specific 
quantifiable attributes of consumer goods. The experimenter secretly manipulated either the price 
or the other quantifiable attributes (i.e., for a laptop computer: the display size, resolution, 
memory, hard drive, and battery life) after a choice between two similar items was made. This 
study differed from previous choice blindness research because specific attributes that led to the 
choice were the focus of manipulation, rather than the choice itself.  
Participants were first asked to make hypothetical choices between three pairs of 
consumer goods: laptop computers, cars, and televisions. The price and the other quantifiable 
choice attributes (i.e., for laptops: display, resolution, memory, hard drive, and battery life) were 
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displayed, allowing the participants to decide between pairs of items. After participants indicated 
their choices between the goods, they rated on a scale of 1 to 5 how important they thought each 
attribute was in making their decision. The experimenter then collected the first three pages of 
the study and presented a brief demographic questionnaire. A manipulation was introduced as 
participants answered the demographic questions. While participants filled out the demographic 
questionnaire, the researcher retrieved a duplicate section (ready with repositionable spray glue) 
from her notebook. This page was placed over the original and contained the manipulation: 
either  switching  the  price  or  the  other  choice  attributes  of  the  laptop  item.  Participants’  choices  
between the two items and their ratings of the attributes remained the same.  
After completing the demographic portion, the researcher assessed the detection rate of 
the laptop item by asking a series of questions. The consumer goods questionnaire was presented 
to participants in the same order. For each pair of consumer goods, the experimenter asked 
participants why they chose a particular item over the other. While participants responded, the 
researcher took notes and paid particular attention to their reaction to the altered laptop item. The 
primary focus of this segment was to observe whether or not participants detected the 
manipulation of either the price of the laptop or the other quantifiable choice attributes, and what 
reasons they gave for their choice. 
H1: First, it was hypothesized that a significant choice blindness effect would be 
established in this experiment. In previous choice blindness research, 70% of participants have 
failed to notice changes in two items and have demonstrated distorted preferences (Johansson et 
al., 2005).  
H2: Second, it was hypothesized that participants who had the price of the laptop item 
manipulated would be significantly more likely to detect the switch than would participants who 
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had the other choice attributes of the laptop manipulated. For a consumer, the price of an item is 
an  extremely  salient  value.  “Price  salience”  has  been  demonstrated  to  be  a  key  factor  that  
influences perceptions of consumer goods and subsequent decision-making (Kim & Kachersky, 
2006).  
H3: Third, it was hypothesized that participants who originally chose the cheaper laptop 
would be more likely to detect the manipulation than would participants who initially picked the 
more expensive laptop. The concept of loss aversion is grounded in both economic and decision 
theory. This idea refers  to  people’s  tendency  to  strongly  prefer  avoiding  losses  to  acquiring  gains  
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1979). A comparison between gains and losses lies at the heart of loss 
aversion. Research on loss aversion in a consumer marketing setting has suggested that monetary 
losses are psychologically twice as powerful as gains (Dawes, 2004).  
Consumer research is a growing field that often has more tangible implications than 
traditional research within the social sciences. Every business strives to understand the thoughts 
and feelings of its target consumers. Consumer insights are typically collected via questionnaires 
that  examine  people’s  preferences  and  views  concerning  existing  and  newly  innovated  products.  
The results gained from these market research efforts are used to help understand and predict the 
choices of consumers. These insights are further used to redesign and develop desirable products 
that will be presumably chosen over competing items for purchase.   
Connecting choice blindness methodology to the domain of consumer choice has 
important real-world implications. Consumers hold firm opinions about marketing and branding 
(Grunert, 2003). As such, they think and reflect about how these opinions may contribute to their 
decisions. With this information in mind, one can neither reject the validity of traditional forms 
of consumer surveys relying on introspection nor the approaches of sensory evaluation in making 
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successful products. Choice blindness is a potentially useful technique to apply to the field of 
consumer marketing, because it combines implicit and explicit behavior and covers numerous 
aspects of decision-making. Understanding the factors that determine the formation of 
preferences and which options consumers will choose is critical for the development of an 
effective marketing strategy.  
Using choice blindness to study consumer decision-making and introspection will further 
develop this methodology for applications beyond the laboratory. The goal of this experiment 
was to reinforce the finding that consumer preferences are not well anchored and can be 
manipulated. The choice blindness methodology was also used to examine introspection and 
self-knowledge within the domain of consumer choice. Finally, establishing a significant choice 
blindness effect in this experiment would put substantial pressure on several aspects of economic 
theory, in particular expected utility models and rational choice theory. 
Method 
Research Design 
 A between-subjects design was used in this experiment. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the two experimental conditions: the price manipulation or the other 
quantifiable choice attributes manipulation. Whether or not the participant detected the switch 
was recorded as the primary dependent measure.  
Participants 
 The sample consisted of 60 participants between the ages of 18 and 23 with a mean age 
of 20.02. Forty-three women and 17 men took part in the study. Thirty participants had the price 
of the laptop item manipulated, while the remaining 30 had the other choice attributes of the 
laptop switched. Each introductory psychology course participant was offered class credit for his 
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or her participation in the study. Additional student participants were obtained by recruiting in 
Shain Library. In all cases it was stressed that participation was voluntary. At the end of each 
trial, all participants were debriefed and informed of the aims of the experiment.   
Materials 
 Consumer goods. The author-designed consumer goods questionnaire consisted of three 
pages. The pages listed the pairs of consumer goods: laptops, cars, and televisions, with each pair 
on a separate page. Identical pictures represented the pairs of items. They were presented side by 
side at the top of each page and the participant chose either item A or B by filling in a check box. 
The price and other quantifiable choice attributes were listed in a separate box under each item. 
The thick outlines allowed the researcher to manipulate the price or choice attributes by covering 
the original box with a duplicate section that was lightly adhered with repositionable spray glue 
(see Figure 1). The ratings of each choice attribute were listed at the bottom of each page and 
were displayed on a scale of 1 to 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Placing the duplicate section over the original choice attributes, manipulated prices are 
highlighted. 
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Demographics and online shopping. An author-designed demographic questionnaire 
with a survey about online shopping was presented after the participant made a choice between 
the pairs of consumer goods. This portion of the study contained demographic items and 
questions  regarding  participants’  use  of  online  shopping  websites.  The  online  shopping  
questionnaire was designed to preserve the deception aspect of choice blindness, as participants 
were told that the study focused on consumer decision-making and online shopping.   
  Notebook. A notebook  was  used  to  record  participants’  verbal  responses after each 
session was completed.    
Procedure 
 Participants were tested individually because of the use of deception in this study. In 
order to obtain participants, students were recruited from the introductory psychology courses at 
Connecticut College. Permission was obtained to introduce the study in-person and a sign-up 
sheet was passed around at the beginning of class. Students wrote down their email if they were 
interested in participating. Potential participants were contacted via email and an appointment 
was scheduled to meet with them individually in the college library. Additional volunteer 
participants were obtained by recruiting in the library at a table in the foyer. In all scenarios the 
experiment was advertised as research regarding consumer decision-making and online 
shopping. This description was crucial to preserve the deception required for the choice 
blindness methodology. In all cases it was stressed that participation was voluntary and that 
individuals could withdraw from the study without penalty at any time. The procedure was 
executed identically for all participants. Participants signed and returned an informed consent 
sheet prior to receiving the experimental materials (see Appendix A).    
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Participants first received the consumer goods questionnaire and were asked to make 
hypothetical choices between three pairs of items: laptops, cars, and televisions (see Appendix 
B). They checked the box of the item they preferred. In order to insure internal validity, the three 
pairs of items were counterbalanced by alternating the order in which they were presented to 
different participants. The price and the other quantifiable choice attributes (i.e., for laptops: 
display, resolution, memory, hard drive, and battery life) allowed the participant to decide 
between the two items. After participants indicated their choice between the two items, they 
rated on a scale of 1 to 5 how important they thought each attribute was in making their decision. 
The experimenter then collected the first three pages of the study and a brief demographic 
questionnaire was presented that included questions focusing on online shopping (see Appendix 
C). The demographic questionnaire was always administered at the end in order to preserve the 
participants’  original  impression  that  the  study  was  testing  consumer  decision-making and online 
shopping alone. 
The manipulation was introduced as participants worked on the demographic 
questionnaire. While the participants were filling out the questionnaire, the researcher kept a 
duplicate section (ready with repositionable spray glue) in a small notebook. This page contained 
the manipulation: either switching the price or the other choice attributes of the laptop item. 
Thirty  people  had  the  price  manipulated  (i.e.,  laptop  A  now  had  laptop  B’s  price),  whereas  
another 30 had the other choice attributes  (i.e.,  laptop  A  now  had  laptop  B’s  display,  resolution,  
memory, hard drive, and battery life) switched. The experimenter secretly placed this duplicate 
section over the original page while the participant focused on completing the demographic 
questionnaire.  Participants’  choice  between  the  two  items  and  their  ratings  of  the  other  attributes  
remained the same.   
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After completing the demographic portion, the researcher assessed the detection rate of 
the laptop item by asking a series of questions. The consumer goods questionnaire was presented 
to the participant in the order that it was given. For each pair of consumer goods, the 
experimenter asked participants why they chose a particular item over the other: “Why  did  you  
choose  laptop  A  over  laptop  B?”  The experimenter then asked specifically why certain choice 
attributes were important in their decision between the two items. For  example,  “I  noticed  that  
you rated hard drive space a 5, why was it important in your decision?”   
While the participant responded, the researcher took notes and paid particular attention to 
the participant’s  reaction  to  the  altered laptop item. The primary focus of this segment was to 
observe whether or not participants detected the manipulation of either the price of the laptop or 
the other quantifiable choice attributes, and to record the reasons given for the choice.  
A  distinction  was  made  between  “concurrent”  and  “retrospective”  detections.  A  trial  was  
be classified as a concurrent detection if a participant clearly noticed the switch. Examples of 
concurrent detections were if participants explicitly reported that the items had been switched, 
that something was wrong with their choice, or if they displayed verbal signs of confusion and/or 
surprise. When a concurrent detection occurred, the following steps were disregarded and the 
experimenter immediately debriefed the participant and explained the goals of the study.  
Retrospective detections occurred when participants claimed that they noticed the 
manipulation later on, but decided not to say anything during the experiment. For participants 
that did not show any concurrent signs of detection, a series of increasingly specific questions 
were asked to make sure their responses were not misclassified as non-detected in a post-test 
interview: 
1. “What  did  you  think  about  the  experiment?” 
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2. “Did  you  find  anything  strange  about  the  experiment?” 
3. “Did  you  notice  anything  strange  about  the  materials  presented  in  the  
experiment?” 
At this point, if a participant did not mention noticing the manipulation or report anything 
strange, then he or she was classified as exhibiting choice blindness. These participants had their 
non-detection recorded. The manipulation was always revealed to participants, regardless of 
whether or not they immediately detected the switch of the laptop item. The experimenter 
removed the  laptop’s  duplicate  section, debriefed the participant, and explained the study and the 
use of deception as follows: 
“This  experiment  is  actually  examining choice blindness in consumer decision-making. 
Choice blindness is a research tool in which the experimenter secretly manipulates the 
relationship between choice and outcome. The choice blindness methodology requires the 
use of deception. As you can see, I switched the price (or the other attributes) of the 
laptop item. When I asked you why you chose one laptop over the other and why certain 
attributes were important in your decision, I was testing whether or not you detected the 
manipulation. I am interested in using choice blindness to study consumer preferences 
and the relationship between intention, choice, and introspection. Please let me know if 
you have any additional questions or concerns about the experiment or the use of 
deception. If you would like your data to be excluded in future analyses, feel free to 
contact me. Because of the deception in this experiment, please refrain from telling other 
students  about  the  true  aims  of  this  study.  Thank  you  for  your  participation.”   
Participants were also given a debriefing form (see Appendix D).  
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Results 
The first hypothesis that a significant choice blindness effect would be established in this 
experiment was supported. Overall, 43 participants (71.7%) failed to detect the manipulation of 
the laptop item. Out of the 17 people (28.3%) who did notice the switch, there were 14 
concurrent detections and 3 retrospective detections (see Figure 2). Concurrent and retrospective 
detections were grouped together for the statistical analysis. The complete distribution of 
detections, non-detections, non-detecting participants who offered justification, and non-
detecting participants who gave self-contradictory justification is presented in Table 1. None of 
the participants noticed the physical manipulation.  
Overall, 12 (27.9%) of the women detected the manipulation compared to 5 (29.4%) of 
the men. This difference was not significant, 2 (1, N = 60) = 0.01, p = .91. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Overall distribution of retrospective detections, concurrent detections, and non-
detections. 
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Table 1 
 
Distribution of Detections, Non-Detections, Non-Detecting Participants Who Offered Justification, and Non-Detecting Participants  
 
Who Gave Self-Contradictory Justification 
  
 
Manipulation Condition          Detections Non-Detections      Non-Detecting Justifications    Non-Detecting Self-Contradictory Justificationsa  
 
 
Price   12  18      9        8         
(n = 30) 
 
Other Attributes  5  25      9        7 
(n = 30)                    
 
 
Total   17  43     18        15 
 
aThese participants initially rated the switched dimension (price or other attributes) to be very important (4 or 5), but when questioned 
later, gave a self-contradictory justification.  
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The second hypothesis that participants who had the price of the laptop item manipulated 
would be significantly more likely to detect the switch than would participants who had the other 
choice attributes of the laptop manipulated was also supported. Of the 30 participants who had 
the price switched, 12 (40%) detected the manipulation. Among the 30 participants who had the 
other attributes of the laptop switched, only 5 (16.7%) noticed the change (see Figure 3). This 
difference in detection rates was significant, 2 (1, N = 60) = 4.02, p = .04.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Figure 3.  Comparison  of  participants’ detection of price and the other attributes. 
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To examine the effects of detection vs. non-detection and manipulation condition on the 
ratings of price or the other attributes, a 2 (detection vs. non-detection) x 2 (price vs. other 
attributes manipulation) multivariate analysis of variance was conducted on  the  participants’  
ratings of price and their mean rating of the other attributes. Neither of the main effects of 
detection (Wilks’s Lambda = 0.93; F(2, 55) = 2.07, p = .14) or manipulation condition (Wilks’s 
Lambda = 0.98; F(2, 55) = 0.47, p = .63) was significant. The interaction of detection x 
manipulation condition was also not significant (Wilks’s Lambda = 0.99; F(2, 55) = 0.18, p = 
.83). Means and standard deviations for the rating of price and the mean rating of the other 
attributes for detection, non-detection, and both manipulation conditions are presented in Table 
2. 
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Table 2 
 
Means and Standard Deviations for the Rating of Price and the Mean Rating of the Other Attributes for Detection, Non-Detection,  
 
and Both Manipulation Conditions 
  
 
          Price Rating       Mean Other Attribute Rating 
 
Manipulation Condition                            Detection             Non-Detection              Detection        Non-Detection  
 
 
Price                            
 M      4.25     3.61    3.63         3.73 
 
SD      0.97     1.14    0.45         0.54 
 
n      12     18    12         18          
        
Other Attributes 
M      4.40     4.04    3.56        3.81   
 
SD      0.55     0.89    0.77        0.56 
 
n      5     25    5        25      
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The third hypothesis that participants who originally chose the cheaper laptop would be 
more likely to detect the manipulation than would participants who initially picked the more 
expensive laptop was not supported. Out of the 18 people who originally chose the cheaper 
laptop, 7 (38.9%) detected the manipulation. Out of the 12 participants who initially picked the 
more expensive laptop, 3 (25%) noticed the switch (see Figure 4). However, this disparity was 
not significant, 2 (1, N = 30) = 0.63, p = .43. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Comparison  of  participants’  detection  of  the  manipulation  of  price  from  lower  to            
higher and higher to lower.  
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Out of the 43 participants who did not detect the manipulation, 18 people gave verbal 
justifications for the choice they did not originally pick. These participants represent 30% of the 
total sample. Out of these 18 people who provided justification, 9 (50%) had the price 
manipulated and the remaining 9 (50%) had the other attributes of the laptop switched. These 18 
participants had their verbal justifications recorded and organized into six categories (see 
Appendix E).  
To examine the effects of participants who provided justification vs. people who did not 
justify and manipulation condition on the ratings of price or the other attributes, a 2 (justification 
vs. no justification) x 2 (price vs. other attributes manipulation) multivariate analysis of variance 
was  conducted  on  the  participants’  ratings  of  price and their mean rating of the other attributes. 
Neither of the main effects of justification (Wilks’s  Lambda  =  0.99; F(2, 55) = 0.12, p = .89) or 
manipulation  condition  (Wilks’s  Lambda  =  0.99; F(2, 55) = 0.15, p = .86) was significant. The 
interaction of justification x manipulation condition was also not significant  (Wilks’s  Lambda  =  
0.98; F(2, 55) = 0.42, p = .66). Means and standard deviations for the rating of price and the 
mean rating of the other attributes for justification, no justification, and both manipulation 
conditions are presented in Table 3.  
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Table 3 
 
Means and Standard Deviations for the Rating of Price and the Mean Rating of the Other Attributes for Justification, No Justification,  
 
and Both Manipulation Conditions 
  
 
           Price Rating        Mean Other Attribute Rating 
 
Manipulation Condition                            Justification       No Justification            Justification      No Justification   
 
 
Price                           
 M      4.14     3.78    3.68         3.70 
 
SD      1.07     1.12    0.53         0.50 
 
n      7     23    7         23         
       
Other Attributes 
M      4.00     4.16    3.71        3.80   
 
SD      0.77     0.90    0.65        0.57 
 
n      11     19    11        19      
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Out of the 18 people who did not detect and provided verbal justification, 15 participants 
gave self-contradictory justifications. These people rated the either the price or the other specific 
attribute(s) that they justified to be very important (4 or 5) in their initial decision prior to the 
manipulation. Of these 15 participants, 6 people (40%) gave self-contradictory justification for 
price, whereas 9 (60%) provided self-contradictory justification for one or more of the other 
attributes. This difference was not significant, 2 (1, N = 15) = 0.80, p = .37. 
To examine the effects of participants who provided self-contradictory justification vs. 
people who did not give self-contradictory statements and manipulation condition on the ratings 
of price or the other attributes, a 2 (self-contradictory justification vs. no self-contradictory 
justification) x 2 (price vs. other attributes manipulation) multivariate analysis of variance was 
conducted  on  the  participants’  ratings of price and their mean rating of the other attributes. 
Neither of the main effects of self-contradictory  justification  (Wilks’s  Lambda  =  0.96;;  F(2, 55) = 
1.28, p =  .29)  or  manipulation  condition  (Wilks’s  Lambda  =  1.00;;  F(2, 55) = 0.01, p = .98) was 
significant. The interaction of self-contradictory justification x manipulation condition was also 
not  significant  (Wilks’s  Lambda  =  0.95;;  F(2, 55) = 1.55, p = .22). Means and standard deviations 
for the rating of price and the mean rating of the other attributes for self-contradictory 
justification, no self-contradictory justification, and both manipulation conditions are presented 
in Table 4. 
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Table 4 
 
Means and Standard Deviations for the Rating of Price and the Mean Rating of the Other Attributes for Self-Contradictory  
 
Justification, No Self-Contradictory Justification, and Both Manipulation Conditions 
  
 
               Price Rating                        Mean Other Attribute Rating 
 
Manipulation Condition                           SCJa          NSCJb              SCJa             NSCJb  
 
 
Price                           
 M      4.50     3.71    3.67         3.70 
 
SD      0.55     1.16    0.57         0.49 
 
n      6     24    6         24          
       
Other Attributes 
M      4.00     4.14    3.53        3.87   
 
SD      0.71     0.91    0.52        0.60 
 
n      9     21    9        21      
                
aSelf-contradictory justification 
bNo self-contradictory justification 
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Discussion 
Choice blindness is a relatively new tool within the field of experimental psychology and 
there has been little research connecting this phenomenon and consumer decision-making. The 
goal of the present study was to examine introspection and self-knowledge in the domain of 
consumer choice using choice blindness methodology. The experiment itself examined the 
outcome of manipulating the price and other specific quantifiable attributes of consumer goods. 
This study was the first of its kind because the specific  attributes  that  led  to  the  participant’s  
choice were the focus of manipulation, rather than the choice itself.   
The primary hypothesis that a significant choice blindness effect would be established in 
this study was supported. It was demonstrated that the vast majority of the sample (71.7%) was 
unable to detect a manipulation of either the price or other quantifiable attributes of the laptop 
item. The 28.3% overall detection rate is similar to the detection rate in previous choice 
blindness studies, which is around 30% (Johansson et al., 2005).  
It could be argued that the overall detection rate might have been higher if the decision 
were of greater importance to the participants. In previous change blindness experiments, people 
were more likely to notice when the changes concerned features that were of central interest 
and/or when participants were particularly knowledgeable about the changed features (Rensink, 
2002; Triesch, Ballard, Hayhoe, & Sullivan, 2003). In the present study, over 70% of participants 
were blind to the mismatch between the intended and the actual outcome of their choice. For 
example, while a participant may have intended to choose the less expensive laptop (a central-
interest, non-peripheral stimuli), he or she failed to realize that he or she ended up with the other 
laptop’s  higher  price.  The  overall  detection  rate  of  the  present  experiment  has  once  again  
established that choice blindness is a robust, replicable, and dramatic effect. If people have full, 
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conscious, and accurate access to their decision-making processes, it would be expected that the 
rate of non-detection would be much lower.  
The strongest evidence that many participants were indeed blind to the mismatch between 
choice and outcome  was  found  in  participants’ verbal justifications. Following the completion of 
the demographic questionnaire, participants were asked why they chose a particular item over the 
other and why certain attributes were important in their decision. Out of the 43 participants who 
revealed no signs of detection, 18 gave verbal reasoning and justification for aspects of the 
laptop that they did not originally choose (see Table 1 and Appendix E). These people represent 
30% of the total sample. In addition, 15 of these non-detecting participants provided self-
contradictory justifications. These people offered a justification that contradicted attribute ratings 
that they judged to be very important (4 or 5) in their initial decision prior to the manipulation. 
Participants who offered self-contradictory justification represent 25% of the total sample. 
There are a number of possible explanations for why participants did not recognize the 
manipulation and in some cases, coherently justified contradictory aspects of their choice. 
Dijksterhuis et al. (2005) suggest that unconscious cognitive processes drive consumers. 
Participants in the present study may not have been consciously aware of their initial judgments 
or the reasoning for their judgments. Therefore, it would not have been possible for people to 
describe their conscious cognitive strategy without a strategy in the first place. These 
justifications and self-contradictory justifications may have represented confabulations based on 
post hoc reasoning, in which case participants were simply not careful enough when making 
their decisions.  In  addition,  the  need  for  consistency  may  have  contributed  to  people’s  
justifications and self-contradictory justifications. Participants could have modified their 
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preference accordingly with what opinions they believed to have previously expressed in order to 
reduce the effects of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957).  
Though the aforementioned explanations are compelling, they cannot fully explain the 
results of the current experiment. The rating aspect of the consumer goods questionnaire 
prompted participants to give careful consideration to all aspects of the items before making their 
choice. This approach made it highly unlikely that people made their judgments impulsively, or 
without consciously reflecting on the attributes. Another possible explanation can be related to 
Nisbett  and  Wilson’s  (1977)  theory. People may have used higher cognitive processes to make 
their decisions, but did not have access to the memory of these processes when they were later 
asked why they chose a particular laptop over the other. Instead, participants used theoretical 
knowledge of why such attributes should be important in their decision, based on salient cues 
from their ratings, to justify their choice. The relatively low detection rate (28.3%) also suggests 
that participants did not have access to the memories of their choice mere minutes after making 
it. This pattern indicates that the memories of the choice must have degraded fairly rapidly after 
they were recorded on the questionnaire.  
The second hypothesis that participants were significantly more likely to detect the 
switch  of  the  laptop’s  price  as  opposed  to  its  other  attributes  was  also  supported.  Past  research  
has emphasized the importance of price as a stimulus dimension in understanding  an  individual’s  
information processing and choice behavior (Garner & Felfoldy, 1970; Rapaport & Wallsten, 
1972). Price plays a multi-dimensional role in influencing purchase decisions and consumers 
view and use this feature in different ways, often re-adjusting its role in their choice behavior 
(Park, Lessig, & Merrill, 1982). This finding is also in accordance with the concept of price 
salience,  where  the  price  of  an  item  is  considered  a  pivotal  determinant  of  people’s  perceptions  
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of consumer goods and subsequent decision-making (Kim & Kachersky, 2006). Yet, research 
investigating what exactly makes a price salient has produced few conclusive findings.  
The  order  in  which  the  laptop’s  attributes  were  listed  in  this  study  may  have  had  an  effect  
on how they were perceived by participants. A stimulus is considered salient to the extent that it 
visually stands out relative to the other stimuli. When people perform a general visual search on 
a page they often follow a pattern that has a great influence on the visual hierarchy. People tend 
to exhibit a top down viewing preference; for that reason, items located at the top of a page will 
have priority in the visual hierarchy over other items on the page (Djamasbi, Siegel, & Tullis, 
2011). In regard to the present experiment, participants may have attached a disproportionately 
high weight to the price of the laptop because it was listed first. This position could have made 
the price visually salient and also more detectable compared to the other attributes.  
The third hypothesis that participants who originally chose the cheaper laptop would be 
more likely to detect the manipulation than would people who initially chose the more expensive 
laptop was not supported. More people in the price manipulation condition initially chose the 
cheaper laptop, which may have affected the results. Out of the 18 people who originally chose 
the cheaper laptop, 7 (38.9%) detected the manipulation. Out of the 12 participants who initially 
picked the more expensive laptop, only 3 (25%) noticed the switch. This difference was not 
significant. A more equal distribution of people in each price choice category and more 
participants overall may have generated sufficient power to produce a significant difference.  
There were several limitations to the current research. Only one type of consumer good 
was manipulated in this experiment: the laptop. It is therefore difficult to generalize the finding 
that  consumer  preferences  are  malleable  to  all  other  consumer  products.  People’s  opinions and 
preferences may be more impressionable for certain types of consumer products. In expanding 
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the categories, future choice blindness research might use a similar paradigm for non-
technological everyday consumer goods (i.e., food or cosmetics) and examine whether there are 
any variations in malleability across different product types.  
Another major limitation of this study was the fact that the price and other attributes of 
the laptop item were not counterbalanced. Participants were more likely to detect the 
manipulation of price as opposed to the other attributes. The price was listed first; for that reason, 
people may have attached a disproportionately high weight to it. Future research on choice 
blindness in consumer decision-making should randomize the order in which price and other 
attributes are listed. 
The reliance on a student sample was an additional limitation. The participant pool in the 
present study yielded disproportionate distributions among age, racial and ethnic backgrounds, 
and gender. Because of the restricted sample, there may be issues regarding the extent to which 
the results are generalizable to the American consumer population as a whole.  
The honesty of participants is also an important factor to consider. People may have 
noticed the manipulation but refrained from verbalizing their detection to the experimenter. This 
issue can be addressed by examining the implicit measures included in the study and the context 
of the verbal reports. Participants were well acquainted with the focus of the choice blindness 
manipulation, the laptop. In reviewing the information collected by the demographic 
questionnaire, all 60 participants reported owning a laptop computer. When the true nature of the 
experiment was revealed to the participants that did not detect the switch, people often expressed 
astonishment and even disbelief. The experimenter had no reason to believe that this reaction 
was anything but genuine and it would be extremely difficult to assess if participants were 
pretending that they did not notice the manipulation.  
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Consumer research is a growing field with tangible implications for real world decision-
making. The choice blindness methodology goes beyond typical consumer research and focuses 
on  people’s  motivations and desires. Previous choice blindness studies in conjunction with this 
experiment  establish  some  counterintuitive  evidence  about  the  vagueness  of  people’s  preferences  
and lack of self-knowledge as consumers. This study demonstrated that participants’  exposure  to  
mismatched outcomes generated significant preference change. This finding puts substantial 
pressure on several aspects of economic theory including expected utility models and rational 
choice theory. If the majority of participants were willing to accept and even endorse the 
opposite of what they intended just minutes earlier,  then  a  choice’s  consequence  cannot  just  be  
an underlying preference. Therefore, it can be inferred that preferences are not only constructed 
to make a particular choice, but are also shaped by the outcome of a decision.   
Every business strives to understand the thoughts and feelings of its target consumers. 
The current research questioned the  prevailing  assumption  that  consumers’  opinions  and  product  
preferences are stable pieces of information. The fact that over 70% of participants were blind to 
the mismatch between the intended and actual outcome of their choice suggests  that  people’s  
preferences and opinions of products are malleable and unstable. Furthermore, the justifications 
and self-contradictory justifications offered by participants who did not detect the manipulation 
imply that consumers do not have introspective access into the cognitive processes responsible 
for their preference formation. It may also be true that participants did not have a thoughtful 
cognitive strategy in the first place. Choice could have been a behavioral event, and the verbal 
responses both on the initial attribute ratings and in any later justifications were simply 
subsequent to the behavior.  
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In  this  experiment,  a  simple  manipulation  changed  the  majority  of  participants’  
preferences. This flexibility is a potential problem for businesses and market research firms that 
use unstable consumer insights to help understand and predict consumer behavior. The 
malleability of consumer preference may help explain the observation that what people say does 
not always predict what they will do (Glasman & Albarracín, 2006). This phenomenon has also 
been recognized to occur in consumer settings (Chandon, Morwitz, & Reinartz, 2004; Simonson, 
2005). If consumer preference is not stable and is subject to change, then it is not surprising that 
people’s  spoken  preference  may  not  predict  future  purchasing  behavior.   
Other than demonstrating that consumer preferences can be manipulated, the current 
study highlights the problem of asking consumers about their opinions. The reasoning behind 
product opinions may not be introspectively or consciously available. Choice blindness is a 
useful technique to apply to the fields of consumer marketing and market research, as it 
combines implicit and explicit behavior and covers numerous aspects of decision-making. 
Understanding the underlying factors that determine the formation of preferences and which 
options consumers will choose is critical for the development of an effective marketing strategy. 
This experiment has shown that consumer preference is far from static; for that reason, it is 
necessary to explore what specific factors contribute to maintaining and strengthening product 
preference. The choice blindness methodology may help to provide a solution to the current 
debate of whether conscious or unconscious influence is stronger in consumer preference 
formation.  
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Appendix A 
Informed Consent 
 
I hereby consent to participate in Jessica  Schanzer’s  research  about  consumer  decision-
making and online shopping. I have been told that there are no known risks or discomforts 
related to participating in this research. I have been told that Jessica Schanzer can be contacted at 
jschanze@conncoll.edu. I understand that I may decline to answer any questions as I see fit, and 
that I may withdraw from the study without penalty at any time. I understand that all information 
provided will not be linked directly to specific participants. Responses are to be combined with 
other  participants’  responses  and  are  not  meant  to  gather information about specific individuals. I 
consent to publication of the results as long as the identity of all participants is protected. I 
consent to the written recording of all interview responses. I understand that the Connecticut 
College Human Subjects Institutional Review Board (IRB) has approved this research.  
Concerns about any aspects of this study may be addressed to Professor Jason Nier, 
Chairperson of the Connecticut College IRB, at janie@conncoll.edu. 
I am least 18 years of age, and I have read these explanations and assurances and 
voluntarily consent to participate in this research about consumer decision-making and online 
shopping.   
 
Name (printed) _____________________________________ 
Signature __________________________________________ 
Date ______________________________ 
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Appendix B 
Consumer Goods Questionnaire 
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Appendix C 
 
Demographic Questionnaire 
 
 
Gender: ______         
 
Age: _____ 
 
Race/Ethnicity: 
a. Hispanic/Latino(a) 
b. Asian/Asian Pacific 
c. Caucasian/White 
d. Native American  
e. African American/Black  
   f. Other __________ 
 
Class year: 
a. 2013 
b. 2014 
c. 2015 
d. 2016 
 
 
Online Shopping Use 
 
1.  Do you own a laptop computer? 
 a. Yes 
 b. No 
 
2. Which do you prefer? (Choose one) 
a. Shopping online 
b. Shopping using catalogues 
c. Shopping in a store  
 
3. Do you have an online shopping account? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
4. If you answered yes, which site(s) do you use? 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Why did you sign up for an online shopping account? 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
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6. On average, how many hours do you spend online shopping 
a. Per day? _______ 
b. Per week? ______ 
 
7.  On average, how many times do you check your online shopping account(s) per day? 
________ 
 
8. On average, how many times do you check your online shopping account(s) per week? 
 ________ 
 
9. Do you get online shopping updates on your phone? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
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Appendix D 
Debriefing Form 
 Thank you for participating in this experiment investigating choice blindness in consumer 
decision-making. Choice blindness is a research tool in which the experimenter secretly 
manipulates the relationship between choice and outcome. The use of deception is a necessary 
aspect of choice blindness. This experiment will help establish that consumer preferences are not 
well defined and can be manipulated. This study will also examine in the relationship between 
intention, choice, and introspection. Because of the deception in this experiment, please 
refrain from telling other students about the true aims of this study. 
 If you are interested in this topic and would like to read the literature in this area please 
contact Jessica Schanzer (jschanze@conncoll.edu). If you have concerns about any aspects of 
this study please contact Professor Jason Nier, Chairperson of the Connecticut College 
Institutional Review Board (janie@conncoll.edu, Ext. 5057). Listed below are three sources you 
may want to consult to learn more about this topic:  
Hall, L., Johansson, P., Tärning, B., Sikström, S., & Deutgen, T. (2010). Magic at the  
marketplace: Choice blindness for the taste of jam and the smell of tea. Cognition,  
 
117, 54-61. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2010.06.010 
 
Johansson, P., Hall, L., Sikström, S., & Olsson, A. (2005). Failure to detect mismatches  
between intention and outcome in a simple decision task. Science, 310(5745),  
 
116-119. doi:10.1126/science.1111709 
 
Johansson, P., & Lars, H. (2008). From change blindness to choice blindness.  
 
Psychologia, 51, 142-155. doi:10.2117/psysoc.2008.142 
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Appendix E  
 
Non-Detecting Participant Justification and Self-Contradictory Justification Quotes 
 
1. Participants who originally  chose  the  cheaper  laptop  (A)  but  justified  the  other  laptop’s  (B)  
higher price: 
 
aParticipant  #7:  “I  think  that  if  it’s  more  expensive,  it’s  better  quality.” 
Rated price 4 
 
aParticipant  #15:  “The  more  expensive  one  is  worth  the  advantages.” 
Rated price 4  
aParticipant  #19:  “I  was  willing  to  pay  more  for  the  longer  battery  life.” 
Rated price 5 and battery 5  
aParticipant  #29:  “Price  was  very  important,  but  the  extra  battery  was  worth  it.” 
Rated price 5 and battery 5  
aParticipant #39:  “I  thought  the  extra  money  would  be  worth  the  investment  because  I’d  use  it  so  
frequently.” 
Rated price 4 
 
aParticipant  #41:  “Even  though  it  cost  more,  it  had  more  battery  so  it’s  worth  it.” 
Rated price 5 
 
2. Participants who originally chose the laptop with lower memory (A) but justified the other 
laptop’s (B) higher memory:  
 
Participant  #2:  “It  has  better  memory  and  I  didn’t  think  a  half  hour  of  battery  made  a  big  
difference.” 
Rated memory 3 and battery 4 
 
a,bParticipant #38:  “I  like  smaller  computers. And it had more memory. Battery-wise  I  don’t  
really  care.” 
Rated memory 4, display 4, and battery 2 
 
aParticipant  #42:  “Display  size  is  less  important  to  me  than  memory.  I  don’t  want  my  computer  
crashing  because  there’s  not  enough  space  or  something.” 
Rated memory 4 and display 3 
 
aParticipant  #48:  “I  wanted  more  memory  because  I  do  a  lot  of  photography.  The  battery  life  was  
pretty  similar.” 
Rated memory 4 and battery 3  
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aParticipant  #50:  “I  don’t  need  a  big  display  or  resolution.  I’d  rather  have more memory just in 
case  something  went  wrong.  The  battery  life  was  fairly  comparable.” 
Rated memory 4, resolution 3, display 3, and battery 4 
 
3. Participants who originally chose the laptop with the larger display (A) but justified the other 
laptop’s  (B)  smaller display:  
 
Participant  #32:  “I  don’t  really  like  bigger  laptops  because  they’re  heavier.” 
Rated display 3  
 
aParticipant  #36:  “I  thought  that  the  screen  size  was  way  too  big.  Also  the  difference  in  battery  
life  was  negligible.” 
Rated display 4 and battery 3 
 
a,bParticipant #38:  “I  like  smaller  computers.  And  it  had  more  memory.  Battery-wise  I  don’t  
really  care.” 
Rated display 4, memory 4, and battery 2 
 
4. Participants who originally chose the more expensive laptop (B) but justified the other 
laptop’s  (A) lower price:  
 
aParticipant  #25:  “I  picked  laptop  B  because  it  was  cheaper.” 
Rated price 4 
 
aParticipant  #45:  “I  picked  laptop  B  mostly  for  the  battery  and  memory.  And  it  was  cheaper!” 
Rated price 4, battery 5, and memory 5 
 
Participant  #47:  “I  chose  it because of the memory and hard drive. The fact that is was less 
expensive  was  a  plus.” 
Rated price 2, memory 4, and hard drive 4 
 
5. Participants who originally chose the laptop with the lower resolution (B) but justified the 
other laptop’s  (A)  higher  resolution:  
 
aParticipant  #18:  “Resolution  was  very  important  to  me  in  my  decision,  so  I  naturally  picked  the  
one  with  better  resolution.” 
Rated resolution 5 
 
bParticipant #22:  “It’s  more  expensive,  but  I  feel  that  makes  it  worth  it.  More  battery,  better  
resolution,  etcetera.” 
Rated resolution 3 and battery 5 
 
6. Participants who originally chose the laptop with less battery life (B) but justified the other 
laptop’s  (A)  higher  battery: 
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bParticipant #22:  “It’s  more  expensive,  but  I  feel  that  makes  it  worth  it. More battery, better 
resolution,  etcetera.” 
Rated battery 5 and resolution 3  
 
aThese 15 participants gave self-contradictory justification, meaning that they rated either the 
price or the other specific attribute(s) that they justified to be very important (4 or 5) in their 
initial decision prior to the switch. 
bParticipants #22 and #38 provided justification for two separate attributes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
